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Abstract. Neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples, which
are malicious inputs crafted to fool pre-trained models. Adversarial ex-
amples often exhibit black-box attacking transferability, which allows
that adversarial examples crafted for one model can fool another model.
However, existing black-box attack methods require samples from the
training data distribution to improve the transferability of adversarial
examples across different models. Because of the data dependence, the
fooling ability of adversarial perturbations is only applicable when train-
ing data are accessible. In this paper, we present a data-free method for
crafting adversarial perturbations that can fool a target model without
any knowledge about the training data distribution. In the practical set-
ting of a black-box attack scenario where attackers do not have access to
target models and training data, our method achieves high fooling rates
on target models and outperforms other universal adversarial perturba-
tion methods. Our method empirically shows that current deep learning
models are still at risk even when the attackers do not have access to
training data.
Keywords: Adversarial Machine Learning · Black-Box Adversarial Per-
turbations
1 Introduction
In recent years, deep learning models demonstrate impressive performance on
various machine learning tasks [2,5,6]. However, recent works show that deep
neural networks are highly vulnerable to adversarial perturbations [4,16]. Ad-
versarial examples are small, imperceptible perturbations crafted to fool target
models. The inherent weakness of lacking robustness to adversarial examples
for deep neural networks brings out security concerns, especially for security-
sensitive applications which require strong reliability [10].
With the knowledge of the structure and parameters of a given model, many
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methods can successfully generate adversarial examples in the white-box man-
ner [16,4]. A more severe issue is that adversarial examples can be transferred
across different models, known as black-box attack [4]. This transferability allows
for adversarial attacks without the knowledge of the structure and parameters
of the target model. Existing black-box attack methods focus on improving the
transferability of adversarial examples across different models under the assump-
tion that attackers can obtain the training data on which the target models are
trained [3,4,7]. Attackers firstly train a substitute model on the same training
data, and then generate adversarial examples in the white-box manner. The per-
turbations crafted for substitute model can thus fool target model, since different
models learn similar decision boundaries on the same training set [4,7].
In practice, however, attackers can hardly obtain the training data for target
model, even the number of categories. For example, the Google Cloud Vision
API2 (GCV) only outputs scores for a number of top classes. On this real-world
black-box setting, most of existing black-box attack methods can not be applied.
In this paper, we present a data-free approach for crafting adversarial per-
turbations to address the above issues. Our method is to craft data-free pertur-
bations that can fool the target model without any knowledge about the data
distribution (e.g., the number of categories, type of data, etc.). We utilize such
a property that the features extracted from different models are usually similar,
since most models are fine-tuned from common pre-trained model weights [8].
Therefore, we establish a mapping connection between fine-tuned model and
pre-trained model. Instead of optimizing an objective that reduces the score of
the predicted labels [4,3], we propose to learn adversarial perturbations that
can disturb the internal representation. Our proposed attack method views the
logit outputs of pre-trained model as the extracted internal representation, and
iteratively maximizes the divergence between clean images and their adversar-
ial examples measured in this representation space. Because of the mapping
connection, pre-trained model and fine-tuned model are similar in the internal
representation and adversarial examples will successfully mislead target model
with high probability.
We evaluate the proposed method on two public datasets: CIFAR-10 [9]
and Caltech-101 [11] and one private dataset with various models including
state-of-the-art classifiers (e.g., ResNet [14], DenseNet [6], etc.). Experimental
results show that on the real-world black-box setting, our method achieves sig-
nificant attacking success rates. In this practical setting of black-box attack sce-
nario, only universal adversarial perturbation methods can be applied since they
are image-agnostic methods. Compared with universal adversarial perturbations
(UAP) [12] and generalizable data-free universal adversarial perturbations (GD-
UAP) [13], the proposed method has the following advantages. First, our method
outperforms UAP and GD-UAP by 8.05% and 6.00%. Second, UAP requires a
number of training samples to converge when crafting an image-agnostic per-
turbation and GD-UAP also need to know the distribution of training data to
achieve better performance. In contrast, our method generates adversarial per-
turbations without knowing the data distribution. Third, the proposed method
does not need training phase. The perturbation can be obtained by a single back-
propagation, whereas UAP and GD-UAP need to train universal perturbation
until it converges.
2 Related Work
White-Box Attack With the knowledge of the structure and parameters of
a given model, many methods can successfully generate adversarial examples in
the white-box manner. Most white-box algorithms generate adversarial exam-
ples based on the gradient of loss function with respect to the inputs. Szegedyet
al. [16] first introduce adversarial examples generation by analyzing the instabil-
ity of deep neural networks. Goodfellowet al. [4] further explain the phenomenon
of adversarial examples by analyzing the linear behavior of deep neural network
and propose a simple and efficient adversarial examples generating method. Re-
cently, Yinpeng Donget al. [3] integrate the momentum term into the iterative
process for fast gradient sign to achieve better attack performance.
Black-Box Attack The existing black-box attacks can be classified as query-
based and transfer-based. In query-based methods, the attacker iteratively queries
the outputs of target model and estimates the gradient of target model [1]. As
for transfer-based methods, the existing methods mainly focus on improving
the transferability of adversarial examples across different models [7]. They as-
sume the adversary can obtain the training data without the knowledge of the
structure and parameters of target model. Because query-based method requires
thousands of queries, it is hard to be used in practical attack. In this paper, we
focus on transfer-based black-box attack.
Recent work by Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [12] presents the existence of image-
agnostic perturbations, called universal adversarial perturbations (UAP) that
can fool the state-of-the-art recognition models on most clean images. Mopuriet
al. [13] further proposed a generalizable approach for crafting universal adversar-
ial perturbations, called generalizable data-free universal adversarial perturba-
tions (GD-UAP). These two image-agnostic universal adversarial perturbations
can effectively attack under real-world black-box setting. Instead of seeking uni-
versal adversarial perturbations, our method is to generate image-specific per-
turbations without knowing data distribution.
3 Data-Free Adversarial Perturbations
Based on the motivation presented in the introduction, we propose the data-free
attack framework. We combine the idea of feature-level attack with the mapping
connection between fine-tuned model and pre-trained model to facilitate black-
box attacking on target model without knowing the data distribution. Specifi-
cally, we use the output of pre-trained model as internal representation to mea-
sure the difference between clean image and adversarial example. By iteratively
maximizing the divergence with respect to our objective function Equation (1),
the internal representation becomes much more different. Finally, because of the
mapping connection, adversarial examples will successfully mislead target model
with high probability. We briefly show our attack framework in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Data-free adversarial attack algorithm.
Input:
A clean image x;
The target model f(x);
The pre-trained model t(x);
Output:
The adversarial perturbations x∗ which misleads target model f(x).
1: Initialize x∗ with x;
2: Compute the objective function Equation (1) with respect to t(x) for x;
3: Use numerical optimization to iteratively maximize the divergence between
x and x∗ by Equation (1);
4: Get the adversarial perturbations x∗ generated by t(x);
5: x∗ misleads target model f(x);
3.1 Problem Definition
Let x denote the clean image from a given dataset, and ytrue denote the class.
A target model is a function f(x) = y that accepts an input x ∈ X and and
produces an output y ∈ Y . f(x) is the outputs of target model including the
softmax function, define fl(x) = z to be the output of final layer before the soft-
max output(z are also called logits), and f(x) = softmax(fl(x)) = y. The goal
of adversarial attack is to seek an example x∗ with the magnitude of adversarial
perturbation  which is misclassified by the target model.
3.2 Black-Box Setting
In this paper, we use the definition of real-world black-box: the adversary can
not obtain the structure and parameters of target model as well as its data
distribution (e.g., the number of categories, type of data, etc.). Moreover, the
target model is fine-tuned on pre-trained model. Let t(x) : x ∈ X ′ → y ∈ Y ′
denote the pre-trained model, where X
′ 6= X,Y ′ 6= Y . Our objective is to
establish a mapping connection between f(x) and t(x) and utilize t(x) to craft
data-free perturbations that can fool f(x).
3.3 Mapping Connection
For general image classification tasks, the extracted features are similar. Instead
of initializing the model with random weights, initializing it with the pre-trained
model can boost performance and reduce training time. Therefore, it is common
to use pre-trained model to fine-tune on new tasks [8]. In this paper, we estab-
lish the relationship between fine-tuned model f(x) and pre-trained model t(x),
called mapping connection. As shown in Figure 1, even though the training data
distribution between f(x) and t(x) is different (X 6= X ′), we consider the logits
output between these two models contain the ’mapping’ connection: given an in-
put x, each neuron in fl(x) may be obtained by weighted summation of neurons
in tl(x). We will give some experimental explanations in Section 4.5. Therefore,
by generating the adversarial perturbations from t(x), it will successfully mislead
f(x) with high probability.
… …
Pre-trained model 𝑡(𝑥) Fine-tuned model f(𝑥)𝑡𝑙 𝑥
f𝑙 𝑥
Fig. 1: Mapping connection between fine-tuned model f(x) and pre-trained
model t(x). Logits output fl(x) and tl(x) may contain mapping relationship.
3.4 Maximizing Divergence
Note in Section 3.1 and Section 3.2, f(x) : x ∈ X → y ∈ Y is target model and
t(x) : x ∈ X ′ → y ∈ Y ′ is pre-trained model. Because f(x) is fine-tuned from
t(x), the data distribution is different from each other (X 6= X ′ and Y 6= Y ′).
Given a clean image x ∈ X, our goal is to utilize t(x) to generate corresponding
adversarial example x∗ which can mislead target model as f(x∗) 6= ytrue.
Our objective is to craft data-free perturbations that can fool the target
model without any knowledge about the data distribution (e.g., the number
of categories, type of data, etc.). Therefore, instead of optimizing an objective
that reduces the score to the predicted label or flip the predicted label [4,3], we
propose to learn perturbations that can maximize feature divergence between
clean images and adversarial examples.
More precisely, x∗ is formulated as a constrained optimization problem:
x∗ = arg max
x′
∥∥∥∥|tl(x)| ∗ tl(x)tl(x′)
∥∥∥∥2
2
subject to ‖x− x∗‖∞ <  (1)
where tl(x) is the output at logits (pre-softmax) layer. Equation (1) measures the
divergence between the logits output of x and x
′
. |tl(x)| represents magnitude of
each element in tl(x) and
tl(x)
tl(x
′ )
represents the difference between tl(x) and tl(x
′
).
Intuitively, our objective function in Equation (1) increases or decreases tl(x
′
)
according to the direction of tl(x). And the magnitude of the change depends
on weight |tl(x)|. We will show the effectiveness of our objective function in
Section 4.6. The constraint on the distance between x and x∗ is formulated in
terms of the L∞ norm to limit the maximum deviation of single pixel to . The
goal is to constrain the degree to which the perturbation is perceptible.
Previous adversarial examples generation methods [16,4,3] aim to increase
the loss function according to the gradient of f(x) (softmax output). However,
due to the deep hierarchy of architectures, the gradients of loss with respect to
input may vanish during propagation. To address this issue, we aim to maximize
the divergence of logits output fl(x) between input x and adversarial example
x∗. Empirically, we found that it is inappropriate to directly use objective func-
tions such as KullbackLeibler divergence to measure the divergence, since the
optimization can be hard to converge.
3.5 Implementation Details
For implementation details, we first scale the input x into [−1, 1] and initialize
x
′
= x. Then, we compute the gradients of objective (1) with respect to input
x. The adversarial examples will be updated by multiple steps. In each step, we
take the sign function of the gradients and clip the adversarial examples into
[−1, 1] to make valid images. Algorithm 2 presents the details of perturbations
generation.
Algorithm 2 Implementation details for data-free perturbations.
Input:
The clean image x;
The maximum deviation of single pixel ;
The number of iterations n;
Output:
The adversarial perturbations x∗ generated by pre-trained model t(x);
1: Initialize: x
′
= x, 
′
= n , i = 0;
2: while i < n do
3: Maximize divergence between x and x
′
by Equation (1):
x
′
i+1 = clip(x
′
i + 
′
sign(5x
∥∥∥|tl(x)| ∗ tl(x)tl(x′ )∥∥∥22),−1, 1)
4: end while
5: return x∗ = clip(x+ sign(x− x′n),−1, 1);
4 Experiments
In this section, we present the experimental results to demonstrate the effective-
ness of our data-free adversarial perturbation method.
4.1 Experimental Settings
Throughout experiments, target models are fine-tuned based on ImageNet [2]
pre-trained models. We first fine-tune the target model on different datasets to
simulate a practical training scenario. Then we only use pre-trained models to
generate adversarial perturbations without knowing the training data distribu-
tion or the architecture of target models by Algorithm 1.
We explore four mainstream deep models: GoogleNet [15], VGG-16 [14],
ResNet-152 [5] and DenseNet-169 [6]. We compare our method to UAP [12]
and GD-UAP [13]. Although some classic attack algorithms such as FGSM [4]
and MI-FGSM [3] are data dependence which are not directly comparable to
ours, we evaluate their attack performance under this black-box attack scenario.
For all the following experiments, perturbation crafted by our method is termed
as DFP . The maximum perturbation  is set to 10 among all experiments, with
pixel value in [0, 255], and the number of iterations is 10.
4.2 Datasets
CIFAR-10 The CIFAR-10 dataset [9] consists of 60,000 colour images across
10 classes, with size of 32×32. We use training images to fine-tune target models
which are pre-trained on ImageNet and use test images to evaluate attack per-
formance. Since UAP and GD-UAP are high resolution perturbations (usually in
224×224), directly using low-resolution images from CIFAR-10 is inappropriate.
Before fine-tuning target models, we resize images to 224 × 224 without losing
recognition performance.
Caltech101 Caltech101 [11]consists of objects belonging to 101 categories. The
size of each image is roughly 300 × 200 pixels. Compared with CIFAR-10, Cal-
tech101 is more complicated with higher resolution.
Cosmetic Insurance Dataset To fully illustrate the effectiveness of our at-
tack method, we construct another private real-world dataset, called cosmetic
insurance dataset. This dataset consists of credentials for customer who are al-
lergic to cosmetic products, including cosmetic products, allergic skin, medical
record, etc. This dataset does not involve any Personal Identifiable Information
(PPI). The data is only used for academic research and processed by sampling.
During the experiment, we conduct adequate data protection to prevent the risk
of data leakage and destroy it after the experiment.
4.3 Data-Free Attack Ability
Table 1 presents the attack performance achieved by our objective on various
network architectures on three datasets. Baseline means the model’s error rate on
clean image (without perturbation). Fooling rate is the percentage of test images
for which our crafted perturbations successfully alter the predicted label. Each
row in the table indicates one target model and the columns indicate different
attack methods. Since UAP and GD-UAP do not provide the perturbation on
Densenet-169, we use “\” in the table. Our perturbations result in an average
fooling rate of 29.23% on Caltech101 which is 8.05% and 6.00% higher than UAP
and GD-UAP. Moreover, compared with UAP and GD-UAP, our method crafts
perturbation by one single back propagation without knowing any training data
distribution which is much more efficient in practical scenario.
Although previous attack methods such as FGSM [4] and MI-FGSM [3] are
training-data dependent which are not directly comparable to ours, we evaluate
their attack performance under this black-box attack scenario shown in Table 1.
It is clear that the fooling rates of FGSM and MI-FGSM under this practical
Table 1: Data-free attack results on CIFAR-10, Caltech101 and cosmetic insur-
ance datasets. Each row in the table shows fooling rates (%) for perturbation
generated by different attack methods when attacking various target models
(columns). Fooling rate is the percentage of test images for which the crafted
perturbations successfully alter the predicted label. Baseline in table means the
models error rate on clean images
Model Baseline GD-UAP [13] UAP [12] FGSM [4] MIFGSM [3] DFP
C
IF
A
R
-1
0 GoogleNet 10.08 18.81 14.13 11.01 12.32 25.26
VGG-16 9.81 17.23 13.21 10.23 11.57 24.37
ResNet-152 8.23 18.09 15.12 9.89 10.28 28.73
DenseNet-169 8.05 \ \ 8.97 10.00 25.64
C
al
te
ch
10
1 GoogleNet 15.31 23.41 21.16 16.21 16.68 28.47
VGG-16 15.27 24.17 22.00 15.76 16.00 29.61
ResNet-152 13.71 22.13 20.38 14.58 15.86 28.77
DenseNet-169 13.68 \ \ 15.01 10.00 30.09
co
sm
et
ic GoogleNet 13.28 18.78 16.53 14.27 15.25 22.73
VGG-16 12.69 17.60 15.27 13.83 14.77 22.41
ResNet-152 10.63 18.97 14.49 12.21 13.39 23.01
DenseNet-169 8.43 \ \ 10.93 11.01 21.84
scenario are significant lower than DFP . Because of the data dependence, fooling
ability of the crafted perturbations in FGSM and MI-FGSM is limited to the
available training data.
Figure 2 shows example data-free perturbations crafted by the proposed
method. The top row shows the clean and bottom row shows the corresponding
adversarial images. The perturbed images are visually indistinguishable form
their corresponding clean images. All the clean images shown in the figure are
correctly classified and are successfully fooled by the added perturbation. Corre-
sponding label predicted by the model is shown below each image. The correct
labels are shown in black color and the wrong ones in red.
4.4 Black-Box Attack Transferability
In section 4.3, we report the attack performance without knowing the training
data distribution. In this section, we evaluate the fooling rates of black-box
attack across different models. Each row in the Table 2 indicates the target
model which generates perturbations and the columns indicate various models
attacked using the learned perturbations. The diagonal fooling rates indicate the
data-free white-box attack noted in Section 4.3, where all the information about
the model is known to the attacker except training data distribution. The off-
diagonal rates indicate real-world black-box attack, where no information about
the model’s architecture or training data distribution under attack is revealed to
the attacker. Our perturbations cause a mean white-box fooling rate of 25.91%
lobster
rooster
pizza
stapler
ceiling fan
crocodile
elephant
cannon
ketch
llama
Fig. 2: Original and adversarial image pairs from Caltech101 dataset generated
for ResNet. First row shows original images and corresponding predicted labels,
second row shows the corresponding perturbed images with their wrong predic-
tions.
Table 2: The transferability of our attack method on CIFAR-10, Caltech101 and
cosmetic insurance datasets. Each row in the table shows fooling rates (%) for
perturbation learned on a specific target model when attacking various other
models (columns). Diagonal rates indicate data-free white-box attack and off-
diagonal rates represent real-world black-box attack scenario.
Model GoogleNet VGG-16 ResNet-152 DenseNet-169
C
IF
A
R
-1
0 GoogleNet 25.26 15.37 12.23 12.47
VGG-16 13.83 24.37 11.63 11.50
ResNet-152 13.43 14.41 28.73 19.65
Densenet-169 14.01 14.65 17.72 25.64
C
a
lt
ec
h
10
1 GoogleNet 28.47 17.23 14.40 15.21
VGG-16 18.88 29.61 16.63 16.01
ResNet-152 15.53 16.98 28.77 17.75
DenseNet-169 14.29 14.71 17.26 30.09
co
sm
et
ic GoogleNet 22.73 15.20 14.17 14.48
VGG-16 14.49 22.41 13.67 13.88
ResNet-152 14.40 13.97 23.01 17.08
DenseNet-169 15.21 13.59 15.63 21.84
and a mean black-box fooling rate of 15.04%. Given the data-free nature of the
optimization, these fooling rates are alarmingly significant.
4.5 Empirical Demonstration of Mapping Connection
As a further analysis, we reveal the mapping connection between fine-tuned
model and pre-trained model noted in Section 3.3. Since the categories of cos-
Fig. 3: Experimental explanation of mapping connection. The horizontal axis
represents categories in ImageNet, and vertical axis represents the proportion of
test images in the cosmetic insurance dataset that is classified as categories in
horizontal axis.
metic insurance dataset have no overlap with ImangeNet [11], we evaluate test
images from cosmetic insurance dataset with ImageNet pre-trained DenseNet-
169 and calculate the frequency occurrence shown in Figure 3. The horizontal
axis represents categories in ImageNet, and vertical axis represents the propor-
tion of test images in the cosmetic insurance dataset that is classified as cate-
gories in horizontal axis. For example, by evaluating test images belonging to
chat record category, there are 35% images classified as category “caldron” in
ImageNet, which has no relationship with chat record.
The frequency occurrence of each category in Figure 3 is higher than 20%.
This phenomenon demonstrates that even though fine-tuned model has different
categories of pre-trained model, the logits outputs between these two models still
contain relationship. Therefore, by disturbing the logits outputs of pre-trained
model, it will successfully disturb the logits output of target model with high
probability, which can cause the wrong prediction.
4.6 Effectiveness of Objective Function
To demonstrate the effectiveness of our objective function (1), we compare the
logits outputs between a clean image tl(x) (left) and the corresponding adversar-
ial example tl(x
∗) (right) after optimizing Equation (1), shown in Figure 4. The
horizontal axis represents each category in ImageNet (tl(x)i, i = 1, 2, · · · , 1000),
and vertical axis represents the value of logits. It can be seen from the figure that
tl(x) and tl(x
∗) have a significant divergence in magnitude and direction. Com-
bined with mapping connection, it make sense that our objective function dose
craft effective data-free perturbations illustrated in Section 4.3 and Section 4.4.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a data-free objective to generate adversarial
perturbations. Our objective is to craft data-free perturbations that can fool
Fig. 4: The left image is tl(x) and right image is tl(x
∗). The horizontal axis
represents each category in ImageNet (tl(x)i, i = 1, 2, · · · , 1000), and vertical
axis represents the value of logits.
the target model without any knowledge about the data distribution (e.g., the
number of categories, type of data, etc.). Our method does not need to utilize
any training data sample, and we propose to generate perturbations that can
disturb the internal representation. Finally, we demonstrate that our objective
of crafting data-free adversarial perturbations is effective to fool target model
without knowing training data distribution or the architecture of models. The
significant fooling rates achieved by our method emphasize that the current deep
learning models are now at an increased risk.
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